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Abstract
Background: Tobacco control strategies have mainly targeted reducing demand. Supply-side focused measures,
though less familiar, deserve consideration, particularly to achieve ‘endgame’ tobacco control aims (e.g. achieving
close to zero smoking prevalence). We explored attitudes towards supply-side focused ‘endgame’ tobacco control
approaches and how they can be best communicated with senior policymakers, journalists, and public health
practitioners.
Methods: We identified five supply-side focused approaches which could potentially lead to the tobacco
endgame: two structural models and three discrete actions. The structural models were: (i) a Nicotine Authority to
coordinate tobacco control activities and regulate the nicotine/tobacco market for public health aims; and (ii) a
Tobacco Supply Agency acting as a monopoly purchaser of tobacco products and controlling the tobacco supply
for public health aims. The actions were: (a) allocating progressively reducing tobacco product import quotas (the
‘sinking lid’) until importation and commercial sale of tobacco products ceased; (b) making tobacco companies
responsible for reducing smoking prevalence with stringent financial penalties if targets were missed; and (c) new
laws to facilitate litigation against tobacco companies. These approaches were presented as means to achieve a
tobacco free New Zealand by 2020 to 19 senior policymakers, journalists, and public health physicians in two focus
groups and eight interviews, and their reactions sought.
Results: The tobacco-free vision was widely supported. Participants engaged fully with the proposed tobacco
control approaches, which were viewed as interesting or even intriguing. Most supported increasing the focus on
supply-side measures. Views differed greatly about the desirability, feasibility and likely effectiveness of each
approach. Participants identified a range of potential barriers to implementation and challenges to successfully
advocating and communicating these approaches. The current framing of tobacco as a risky but legal commodity
was noted as an important potential barrier to implementing endgame approaches.
Conclusions: Endgame tobacco control approaches were considered to be viable policy options. Further policy
analysis, research and public discussion are needed to develop endgame approaches. A significant change in the
public framing of tobacco may be a prerequisite for implementing endgame solutions.
Background
Around the world, interventions to reduce smoking pre-
valence have mostly been introduced incrementally and
have mainly focused on trying to reduce demand. Exam-
ples include providing support for smoking cessation,
health education in schools and through mass media
campaigns, and mandated warnings on packaging. Regu-
lation has mostly been limited to controls on marketing,
such as restrictions on advertising and sponsorship, and
more recently on point of sale tobacco product displays
[1]. There has also been substantial regulation in many
jurisdictions on where smoking can occur, with restric-
tions on smoking in indoor public spaces and work-
places now commonplace in developed countries [2,3].
There has been less attention paid to regulation of the
nature of tobacco products, or to restricting their supply
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ors such as minimum age of purchase [4,5]. A few juris-
dictions have regulated the fire safety [6,7], or flavours
of tobacco products [8]. More fundamentally, there have
been few efforts to address the structure of the supply
and distribution system for tobacco products. In most
countries this is an unregulated market, in which
tobacco companies manufacture and/or import and dis-
tribute tobacco products, and retailers sell tobacco pro-
ducts on a commercial basis with the aim of maximising
sales and profits [9]. In those countries where the state
had a monopoly on tobacco product distribution, they
are mostly being transformed through takeover and col-
laboration with tobacco companies from the developed
world. Such monopolies have acted to maximise return
to the state rather than in the interests of public health,
except possibly unintentionally by being less efficient
and aggressive than companies at promoting their
tobacco products [10-12].
As a result, compared to other potentially hazardous
products such as pharmaceuticals and agricultural poi-
sons like pesticides, there is little or no control of con-
tent and design, or of the supply and retailing of
tobacco products. This contrasts with other nicotine
delivery devices such as nicotine replacement therapies,
which are far more rigorously regulated as pharmaceuti-
cals. Hence there is a regulatory imbalance between
smoked tobacco and nicotine replacement therapy
(NRT) products [13-15], in which the degree of regula-
tion is in inverse relationship to a product’s toxicity and
harm to population health [16]. In addition, in most
countries there is a tension between commercial pres-
sures from companies which profit from tobacco sales,
and the public health need to reduce tobacco use to
protect health. Because tobacco products are often heav-
ily taxed, there is also a potential tension within govern-
ments between tobacco as a source of government
revenue, and the social and economic consequences of
tobacco use [14,17,18].
There is growing interest internationally in policy
solutions that target the nature of the nicotine market.
These include balancing the regulatory playing field in
favour of non-smoked or non-tobacco nicotine mainte-
nance. One suggested mechanism is to introduce regula-
tory authorities with sufficient powers to limit
commercial activity, and achieve a healthier regulatory
balance between smoked tobacco and pharmaceutical or
other safer nicotine delivery products [18-23]. More
definitively, some authors have argued that the tobacco
product production and distribution systems should be
changed, for example, through the creation of a not-for-
profit distribution agency [24], making the tobacco
industry a not-for-profit enterprise [9,25], or through a
progressive reduction in the importation and release for
sale of smoked tobacco products [26,27].
In parallel with this debate about methods, has been a
renewed focus on policy end points. National strategies
have often included goals which focus on process indi-
cators (for example numbers of smokers trying to quit)
or have set modest, incremental targets for smoking
prevalence reduction [28].
Recently some tobacco control organisations and offi-
cial bodies have advocated more ambitious targets
where the aim is to reduce tobacco smoking prevalence
to close to zero within the short to medium term. These
targets represent a tobacco ‘endgame’ scenario. For
example, in Finland a Tobacco Act was passed in 2010
which aimed to “put an end to the use of tobacco pro-
ducts in Finland”, though no mechanism for achieving
this was detailed [29]. This Act followed a recommenda-
tion from The Cancer Society of Finland that Finland
should be wholly smokefree by 2040 [30]. In New Zeal-
and, the Tupeka Kore (tobacco free) vision was
launched by a range of concerned NGOs and advocacy
groups in 2009. This proposed a target and a series of
interventions to achieve close to zero tobacco smoking
prevalence by 2020 [31]. Subsequently, the Māori Affairs
Parliamentary Select Committee released a report
recommending that New Zealand should be smokefree
by 2025 [32], and the Government has since affirmed
support for this goal [33].
However, the increasing interest in supply-side and
endgame strategies has seldom been reflected in the
political agenda or national tobacco control strategies.
The most dramatic exception is in Bhutan, where the
sale of tobacco products was banned in 2004 [34].
The study we report here was carried out in New
Zealand where tobacco-related harm remains high. Fol-
lowing substantial declines in the 1970s and 1980s,
recent trends have been for a very gradual decline in
smoking prevalence [35,36], which remains about 20%
among adults, with much higher prevalences among
young adults, Māori (above 40% prevalence) and socio-
economically disadvantaged groups [37]. Tobacco is not
grown commercially in New Zealand and is all imported
in raw form (for a single cigarette manufacturing plant)
or is imported as manufactured cigarettes. Current regu-
lation greatly limits advertising and sponsorship,
requires indoor public areas to be smoke-free, and man-
dates pictorial health warnings on packs. In addition,
increased taxation (price) and social marketing have
been used to try to reduce smoking and exposure to
secondhand smoke. The cessation system includes a
national telephone Quitline, considerable availability of
subsidised NRT products and some specific cessation
support programmes for high-risk groups.
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2008 suggested that radical endgame solutions are
poorly understood by the public, media and policy
makers, and are difficult to communicate. It was there-
fore timely to investigate the feasibility and acceptability
of these new approaches to tobacco control, in the
absence of any body of literature that had probed these
issues of understanding and communication for
endgames.
The aim of the ‘Daring to Dream’ study was to the
investigate views and understanding of the public, health
practitioners, media and policy makers to innovative
supply-side and endgame strategies to tobacco control.
We report here on phase one of this study in which we
explored views about five endgame-orientated tobacco
control approaches with public health physicians, media
commentators and policy-makers in New Zealand. The
second phase of the study involved assessing the reac-
tions of policy-makers, tobacco control and public
health practitioners, ands m o k i n ga n dn o n - s m o k i n g
members of the public to the communication of a speci-
fic endgame strategy. Specifically, in this paper we set
out to explore how easily the five endgame approaches
were understood, discuss possible communication stra-
tegies, and explore participants’ reactions to the ideas.
Methods
From a review of relevant literature and discussions
between the team and the project’s Advisory Group, we
identified five novel tobacco control interventions or
approaches. They shared two key characteristics. Firstly,
they addressed to some degree the supply-side of
tobacco control. Secondly, all were judged to have
strong potential to achieve or substantially contribute to
achieving the tobacco ‘endgame’ of close to nil smoking
prevalence. An important additional consideration was
the feasibility and appropriateness of the interventions
in the New Zealand context. For example, mandating a
not-for-profit tobacco industry [9,25] in New Zealand
was rejected, as nearly all smoked tobacco products in
New Zealand are imported.
The five ideas (see table 1) comprised two structural
models and three actions.T h estructural models were
overarching changes to the regulatory framework or
structure of the tobacco product market. The first was
the introduction of a semi-autonomous Tobacco Con-
trol Authority with strong regulatory powers [20,21].
The second was the implementation of a semi-autono-
mous agency (The NZ Tobacco Supply Agency) to act
as a monopoly purchaser of tobacco products, and con-
trol a not-for-profit supply and distribution system
[24,38,39].
The actions were more discrete tobacco control inter-
ventions with a supply-side focus. The first was a
proposal that a ‘sinking lid’ system of reducing import
quotas (10% reduction in absolute terms per year)
should be introduced for tobacco products, until impor-
tation and commercial sale of tobacco products ceased
in 10 years time [27]. The second was to introduce a
system in which tobacco companies were made respon-
sible for achieving annual targets for reduction in smok-
ing prevalence and tobacco consumption, with a zero
prevalence and consumption target over a fixed period
(10-15 years) [40]. Failure to achieve targets would
result in stringent penalties for the tobacco companies.
The third action was that new legislation should be
introduced (or existing legislation amended) to facilitate
individual and group-based legal action against the
tobacco industry in relation to the harm caused by
tobacco products. The actions by British Columbia
(joined later by other Canadian provinces) to legislate to
enable such litigation is a version of this action [41].
We used in-depth qualitative research methods -
including interviews and focus groups - for data collec-
tion during May to August 2008. We carried out two
focus groups with (i) six public health physicians
(Group 1), and (ii) three policy makers and two journal-
ists (Group 2); and in-depth interviews with four policy
makers and four journalists. The participants included a
mix of senior policy officials from the Ministry of
Health, as well as from other sectors of government (e.g.
Treasury). We purposively selected participants to
gather a diverse range of opinions from a range of key
stakeholders in the policy-making process and experi-
enced senior journalists from national news media, of
whom only one was a specialist health reporter. We
identified participants through consultation within the
research team and with the Advisory Group, and via
snowballing recruitment [42]. Participants were
approached and invited to participate by one of the
authors (MR).
We summarised the five approaches in an information
sheet provided in advance for the study participants. We
sent additional information in the form of key articles
about some of the approaches to participants ahead of
the focus groups and interviews, if requested.
Participants in an initial focus group with public
h e a l t hp h y s i c i a n ss u g g e s t e dt h a ti tw a si m p o r t a n tt o
provide a justification for implementing supply-side and
other major tobacco control measures, and to outline a
credible vision of what the endgame approaches were
seeking to achieve. Therefore, contextual data showing
the burden of disease and mortality caused by smoking
and the slow decline in smoking prevalence in New
Zealand over the previous decade together with an out-
line of a vision of a tobacco-free future were added to
the information sheets for the subsequent interviews
a n df o c u sg r o u p( G r o u p2 ) .T h ev i s i o np o r t r a y e da
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dren in New Zealand was protected from tobacco smok-
ing. This was adapted from the existing Tupeka Kore
vision [31].
The focus groups were carried out by two of the
authors RE and MR. Interviews were carried out by MR,
sometimes with additional input from RE. We carried
out data collection in a university setting or in indivi-
dual participants’ offices, as convenient for the partici-
pant. We used a schedule to guide the content of the
interviews and focus groups. Interviews and focus
groups were audio-recorded and transcribed.
The transcripts were coded and analysed to identify
key themes and sub-themes. We identified themes from
those within the interview/focus group schedule, and
also new themes arising inductively from participants’
statements. One of the authors (MR) prepared a data
matrix in which relevant quotes from the interviews and
focus groups were collected together under each identi-
fied theme and sub-theme. The dominant and divergent
or contrary opinions within each theme and sub-theme
were identified by MR. Quotes were chosen by MR and
RE to illustrate participants’ views where they were par-
ticularly apt and succinct. The final write up of the
results and choice of quotes was back-checked by RE
against the data matrix to ensure that it was a valid
representation of the findings.
The research was granted ethics approval through the
University of Otago ethics approval process (Category
B). Participation was voluntary and all participants gave
their informed consent to participate and were assured
of anonymity.
Table 1 The five endgame approaches as presented to participants
Endgame approach Key features of model or action
Model 1: Nicotine Authority Regulates the nicotine/tobacco market to achieve public health aims
Government-owned but independent from government
Operating costs could be covered from tobacco tax revenues
Broad range of possible roles and powers, e.g.:
￿ Set tobacco tax and retail price levels
￿ Control all aspects of tobacco product marketing and design: including retailing,
plain packaging, ingredients and additives, nicotine content etc.
￿ Require tobacco businesses to disclose all required information to it
￿ Fund and commission tobacco control activities such as social marketing campaigns
and quit smoking support
Introduce subsidies for safer nicotine products.
Model 2: Tobacco Supply Agency Non-profit-making independent (but government-owned) agency that controls supply and
access to tobacco/nicotine products
Has public health aims, not-for-profit
Operating costs could be covered by tobacco tax
Tobacco manufacturers can only sell products to the Agency
Agency specifies features such as product packaging, ingredients and additives, and nicotine
content
Agency supplies products to licensed retailers, and sets requirements for their activities,
including retail prices
Agency could also have a broad range of activities like those described for the Nicotine
Authority (see Model 1 above)
Fixed life - to end in 2020 or before, when targets met.
Action 1: Tobacco companies bid for reducing
quotas
Tobacco companies bid for quotas to supply cigarettes and tobacco to New Zealand
market
Quotas reduced progressively e.g. 5% absolute reduction every six months, reducing to zero
in 10-15 years.
Action 2: Penalties for tobacco companies, to
promote rapid smoking reductions
A new law mandates yearly targets for tobacco companies to reduce smoking prevalence
and end smoking over a fixed period (e.g. to zero in 10-15 years)
Severe penalties imposed on tobacco companies ($ many millions) if the targets are not
met.
Action 3: New laws make it easier to take tobacco
companies to court - and win
New legislation or change to existing legislation (e.g. strengthening the New Zealand Fair
Trading Act) to make it substantially easier for individuals, groups or the government to take
tobacco companies to court for selling a harmful product
Companies could be prosecuted for things like failing to make cigarettes fire-safe, or for
adding chemicals that make tobacco more addictive and cigarettes sweeter-tasting.
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General views on endgame and supply-side ideas for
tobacco control
All participants supported increased action against
tobacco, and discussed endgame solutions with keen
interest.
“How far we’ve come - it’s the story isn’t it? ...and
what’s the next chapter, and how do we get to the
epilogue?” - Public Health Physician
The vision of a tobacco-free world for New Zealand
children by 2020 resonated strongly with research
participants who used words like ‘compelling’, ’power-
ful’ and ’fantastic’ to describe it, though there was
also some scepticism expressed whether the time-
frame was realistic, and a comment that it should be
tested to see if it worked for Māori. The focus on
children was mostly seen as a particularly strong
point.
“ ...points about children being protected from seeing
tobacco [smoking] as a normal and benign behaviour
and protected from secondhand smoke in all settings
would be widely acceptable.” - Policy Official
“ ... this idea of us older folk having created an envir-
onment which is damaging to our kids is very power-
ful.” - Policy Official
There was mostly strong support for exploring inno-
vative supply-side focused tobacco control measures.
“We have looked at demand... - but we need to look
at supply-side and [the]... regulation of that, or man-
agement of that in a better way. .... got to get politi-
cians or the community to think about ... stronger
supply-side management” - Policy Official
Participants considered it important in communicat-
ing innovative supply-side ideas to provide a clear
rationale for supply-side activities, and to include the
economic as well as health costs of tobacco. The
tobacco industry was generally seen a key barrier to
tobacco control, with strong measures needed to coun-
ter its influence.
Views on specific models and actions
All five of the endgame concepts were received favour-
ably by some of the participants, but there was little
consensus about the preferred model or action. There
was a general sense that supply-side measures would be
difficult to achieve politically, and numerous potential
barriers were suggested.
Model 1: Nicotine Authority
Research participants noted that a Nicotine Authority
would address the current asymmetry between the
industry and consumer. Positive features mentioned
included that it would facilitate the introduction of
further tobacco control measures (including harm
reduction and supply-side focused policies) and would
build on the current smoke-free momentum in New
Zealand. Another positive feature noted by some partici-
pants was that it didn’t raise the perceived moral and
ethical dilemmas presented by government supply of
tobacco products (see Model 2 below). It was mostly
seen as a ‘sensible’, less radical approach.
One of the possible powers for the authority was sta-
ted by the research theme as setting levels of tobacco
product taxation. This was a central issue for many par-
ticipants. Some participants saw the ability to set tax as
crucial for the agency to be effective. However, others
argued it was unlikely such an Authority would ever be
allowed to set tax rates itself; and that it would be politi-
cally unacceptable and strategically undesirable for the
Authority to control its own income from tax and duty
levels.
There was a range of other critical comments. Some
participants noted that with a Nicotine Authority the
legitimacy of the industry is preserved and the structure
of the tobacco product market is left intact. As a result
it may have minimal impact, representing only a weak
‘slap on the wrist’ for the industry. Others noted that
the Authority may provide industry with a negotiating
platform, and could be a focus for on-going and costly
conflict with the industry.
“Model 1 strikes me as harm reduction... what can
we do without dealing with the fundamental supply
system” - Public Health Physician
“You leave the beast intact inside your country and it
will find a thousand ways to fight ...[that] would be
v e r ye x p e n s i v ef o rt h eN i c o t i n eA u t h o r i t y ” - Policy
Official
Others thought the Authority could result in nicotine
addiction being accepted and maintained in the popula-
tion, and that nicotine would be perceived to be treated,
confusingly, as both a medicine and a poison.
“Less desirable than some of the other models - you’re
accepting nicotine addiction ... A win in public health
terms but ... less desirable if perpetuating nicotine
addiction.” - Public Health Physician
Finally, some participants had concerns about the
effectiveness of a Nicotine Authority in practice. One
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sectors, that the Authority would be subject to constant
time-consuming Official Information Act requests, and
expensive legal attacks. Another thought that it would
be complex to set up, and it would only occur if there
was a broad coalition and cross-party political support.
Model 2: New Zealand Tobacco Supply Agency
The Tobacco Supply Agency was seen by some partici-
pants as more of an endgame solution than the Nico-
tine Authority. Participants identified the Agency as
having more powers and multiple functions, including
combining demand-side and supply-side activity. Those
who viewed this approach positively felt that it was sim-
p l ea n db o l d ,h a dac l e a r e rs u p p l y - s i d ef o c u s ,a d d r e s s e d
directly the role of the tobacco industry, and accepted
that industry was ‘fatally flawed’ and had to be
removed.
“Model 2 is much bolder, and much clearer... it ....
identifies the industry as the problem ...” -P o l i c y
Official
“[it] ..seems to more effectively reduce their [tobacco
companies’] power base within the country.” -P o l i c y
Official
“You’v eg o tt op i c ky o u rg r o u n da n dIr e c k o nm o d e l
two picks much more interesting ground to fight on.”
- Policy Official
The most commonly identified barriers were the per-
ceived political and ethical difficulties of the government
selling tobacco or nicotine. One policy official feared
this could be viewed as retrograde, like “going back to
prohibition”. Some participants viewed that as ’weird’ or
’dissonant’; and thought such ethical issues would make
it difficult to communicate the idea and gain public
acceptance. This would create political difficulties.
“I feel queasy about the state setting up an agency to
peddle something which is inherently harmful” - Pol-
icy Official
“You are essentially having the government as a
dealer of tobacco. I think that would be quite a diffi-
cult position for a government to be in... I don’tl i k e
that idea” - Journalist
In addition, if the government controlled the supply
and sale of tobacco products, there could be perverse
incentives for the government to encourage consump-
tion in order to maintain sales and revenue generation.
Some participants thought that the Agency could send
conflicting messages: such as ‘legitimising’ ah a r m f u l
substance and nicotine addiction, and potentially absol-
ving tobacco companies of responsibility.
Finally, some participants indicated that there were
major structural challenges involved. An agency which
is government-owned but truly independent was a chal-
lenging idea and would take years to establish. Some
participants felt much more detailed policy work was
needed on the practicalities of the implementation of
this model. Another Public Health Physician thought
this model was too complex (”This is written for people
who understand policy”) to communicate in its current
formulation and needed to be simplified as to what it
means in concrete terms for smokers and non-smokers.
Action 1: Tobacco companies bid for reducing quotas
Several participants favoured this approach, seeing it as
innovative, thoughtful and possible. Some saw it as a
way to achieve the endgame, with tobacco gradually
becoming invisible. The gradualness of the change was
seen positively by making it politically and socially
acceptable (”less controversial”), and offering a transition
period before tobacco companies cease operating in the
New Zealand market. Some made analogies with fishing
quotas and carbon emissions trading, and previous
restrictions to alcohol supply in New Zealand.
Other advantages cited were that the process of bid-
ding for quotas would result in pitting tobacco compa-
nies against each other. Participants thought that the
price of tobacco would go up as a result of the declining
quota - a desirable result from a tobacco control
perspective.
However, some participants found it difficult to see
how the system would work, especially in relation to
market forces and price, and the practicalities of supply
at the population and individual level. One participant
noted that this approach would need to be accompanied
by strong activity to reduce demand (to match reducing
supply), while another thought that individual smokers
would need to be assigned a quota as well as the
tobacco companies. This would require a verification
system at purchase, and could create practical difficul-
ties. Concerns about possible interruptions to supply
were raised. These could be problematic, particularly for
the most heavily addicted smokers.
“Where it will cause freak-out is when the dairies
(small local general stores) run out at the end of the
m o n t ho rw h e n e v e rt h er e l e a s ec y c l ei s-y o u ’ll have
the whole population going cold turkey.” -P u b l i c
Health Physician
Others suggested a black market might develop, dri-
ven by the high price in legally available tobacco, and
strong enforcement would be needed to control this.
Problems were also foreseen on the basis that tobacco is
a legally traded product. Quotas might risk challenges
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concerns about the impact of price rises on poor smo-
kers, and resulting adverse media publicity. Making sure
smokers had access to cessation support was seen as
essential if the supply of tobacco was progressively
restricted.
Action 2: Penalties for tobacco companies, to promote
rapid smoking reductions
Some participants were intrigued and fascinated by this
idea and thought it a logical approach in line with the
‘polluter pays’ principle. However, overall there was less
support for this intervention. Participants foresaw many
negatives, particularly about practical issues of imple-
mentation. For example, given that there are several
independent companies supplying the New Zealand
market, it was difficult to see how they would be held
collectively responsible, and how the share of penalties
would be apportioned between companies. Participants
thought that there was potential for this approach to
encourage black market supply and gaming by compa-
nies, and noted that penalties would have to be very
high to offset the profits from sales and deter compa-
nies. Potential legal problems were also identified, for
example: companies may not be easily held accountable
in law for individuals’ behaviour or for reducing sales of
a legal product; and if there is smuggling or a black
market, companies could reasonably argue that smoking
prevalence and consumption was not fully under their
control. As a result of these concerns, participants
thought that litigation and enforcement costs might be
prohibitive.
One participant thought a major conceptual barrier
was the ingrained nature of market theory in New Zeal-
and. Participants felt that the end-point of this approach
was unclear - for example, would tobacco be phased out
and become illegal? Finally, some participants thought
that penalty payments would need to be allocated to the
health system to avoid the system being seen as a gov-
ernment revenue-gathering exercise.
Action 3: New laws make it easy to take tobacco
companies to court - and win
Changing laws to make it substantially easier for indivi-
duals, groups or the government to take tobacco compa-
nies to court for selling a harmful product was seen as a
useful mechanism in tobacco control, with the advan-
tage of moving the focus from the government to the
courts and judiciary. It was seen by some as less radical
and hence more ‘doable’ than other approaches, and
could help counter ‘nanny state’ accusations against
tobacco control efforts by ensuring that power and con-
trol are delegated to individuals. Participants were aware
of major tobacco industry Court settlements and other
successful outcomes in USA Courts.
However, overall there was less support for this action
than for the other approaches. Several thought New
Zealanders were insufficiently litigious for this measure
to succeed, and there was a general reluctance to move
towards a more litigious society. The approach was
viewed (negatively) as creating “al a w y e r s ’ heaven” by
one participant.
“[I] worry about creating a litigious culture in New
Zealand - you could start with tobacco because
everyone agrees it’s harmful, but... where does that
principle take you? - anything perceived by someone
else to be harmful becomes open to litigation” -P o l -
icy official
In addition it was seen as a high-risk approach as
there was great potential to lose in the Courts, especially
given the tobacco industry’s resources. Some expressed
little faith in the court and justice system, citing the fail-
ure to enforce existing laws, such as selling tobacco to
underage consumers, or felt that the Courts do not
properly understand tobacco issues. Others saw success-
ful US precedents as having little relevance, as the USA
tort system differs from New Zealand’s. There were con-
cerns raised about the slowness and expense of using
the Courts, the expertise of the industry in thwarting
legal approaches, the fragmented and disorganised nat-
ure of relying on multiple individual Court cases, and
the poor cost-effectiveness of using public resources in
legal battles against the industry. Some questioned who
would pay for the litigation.
“...the companies have a massive incentive to pour
immense resources into those [Court] cases... [it is]
barking up the wrong tree to dedicate public resource
to that” - Policy official
Finally, the approach was thought by some partici-
pants to be too indirect, and another noted that that
while it may make things harder for the tobacco compa-
nies, it was unlikely to be a rapid method to achieve
endgame goals. Government regulation was seen as a
more direct and more effective approach.
“If there are things we want to prohibit, we should do
that directly through government policy and regula-
tion rather than asking the Courts to make judge-
ments” - Policy official
“..if tobacco companies are including chemicals that
make tobacco more addictive and sweeter tasting ...
rather than use Courts ....[The] Government could
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in New Zealand.” - Policy official
Other general themes
Nanny state and anti-bureaucracy political climate
Many participants noted that the current political envir-
onment and public sentiment in New Zealand was unfa-
vourable to measures which could be seen or portrayed
as increasing government control over individuals’ lives,
or resulted in the creation of new bureaucracies. There-
fore a commonly stated view was that the proposed
models and actions would be difficult to achieve politi-
cally, particularly creating a new organisation such as
the Nicotine Authority or Tobacco Supply Agency.
“How you are going to sell it politically in a climate
where ‘nanny-state’ is poison?” - Journalist
“...[it] buys into the whole ‘nanny state’ thing - enor-
mous backlash - here’s yet another government
authority telling us what to do.” -P u b l i cH e a l t h
Physician
Preferences for using existing structures and mechanisms
Some participants favoured strengthening existing gov-
ernmental tobacco control arrangements, such as the
team within the Ministry of Health, and opposed estab-
lishing new stand-alone agencies. One reason was that
setting up new agencies could take years. Another was
that small stand-alone agencies may be less able to carry
out complex regulatory functions than a government
department which had the necessary critical mass, skills,
expertise and resources - particularly in the face of skil-
ful opposition from the tobacco industry. Finally, some
participants thought recent experience suggested that
new agencies were vulnerable to attack and disestablish-
ment.
“The history of regulatory bodies is that they’ve
tended to come and go. When the going gets tough
someone disestablishes them and takes the regulatory
function back centrally” - Policy official
Some simply preferred evolutionary change:
“Philosophically... I am opposed to structural
change... all my experience tells me you lose three or
four years... setting up new entities, getting them
going...; and so my approach ...is to use what you’ve
got and push that harder” - Policy official.
Framing of tobacco products and endgames
The importance of how tobacco products and tobacco
control efforts are framed was a recurring theme. For
example, some participants felt that many people in
New Zealand thought that the battle against tobacco
was largely over, particularly among older, more highly
educated people, including policy and media workers.
The reasons given included that smoking is much less
visible and less socially acceptable, and that many people
have become blasé about smoking as a significant health
concern.
“If smoking is off their radar screen in their everyday
lives, it ... is harder to engage them in the idea that
they need to do more about it” - Journalist
Some participants noted that in order to ‘sell’ end-
game solutions or structural reforms, the extent of the
public health problem had to be clearly explained to
create a clear rationale for action ("sell the problem
before you sell the solution”).T h i sw a sd e s c r i b e da s
establishing the ‘burning platform’.
One participant suggested that how tobacco products
are framed dictates how they are treated by government
and agencies of government, by the legal system and by
society in general; and determines what is politically
possible and acceptable. This participant thought the
dominant framing of tobacco products was as a some-
what risky but legal commodity and as a tax source,
making governments reluctant to intervene to control
supply. (S)he argued that to overcome ‘nanny state’
accusations and make endgame solutions acceptable,
tobacco products would need to be framed and viewed
by society and policy-makers as highly hazardous (e.g. as
a ’poison’) to individuals and society, i.e. in the same way
that hard drugs are generally viewed. Tobacco products
would then be seen as unsuitable for normal commer-
cial activity, and bolder and more rigorous measures to
reduce tobacco use would be justified. Another partici-
pant noted that tobacco control needed to be framed
like work on other public health hazards such as infec-
tious diseases control, in order to justify urgent and
concerted action.
The way major endgame interventions are framed was
also seen as important in the communication of such
approaches. For example, one view was that the benefits
of tobacco control needed to be seen through a broader
lens than that of public health, and be seen as part of
society’s greater goals for well-being and prosperity. The
importance of linking the endgame interventions to the
achievement of a credible and desirable vision was
emphasised by some. Other participants noted that the
u s eo fa n a l o g i e sw o u l db ei m p o r t a n tt oj u s t i f ya n d
explain the need for more rigorous measures. For exam-
ple, the approach to tobacco could be compared and
contrasted with ‘party pills’ (recently banned in New
Zealand) and illegal drugs (for which supply-side
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endgame solutions that some participants noted was
that social attitudes have changed, that smoking is much
less socially acceptable and there is no public sympathy
for the tobacco companies. One participant argued that
once the ‘tipping point’ was reached, politicians would
likely jump on the endgame bandwagon to associate
themselves with a winning issue.
Discussion
We found that a tobacco-free vision was widely wel-
comed by public health practitioners, policy-makers
and journalists. There was also general support for a
greater focus on supply-side measures. The five pro-
posed ‘endgame’ approaches were viewed as interest-
ing, but there were widely differing views about the
desirability, feasibility and likely effectiveness of each.
There was a general sense that supply-side focused
measures would be difficult to achieve politically in the
current New Zealand setting, and numerous barriers
were advanced.
Supply-side approaches were also viewed with caution
by many participants. There may be many reasons for
this caution including: novelty and unfamiliarity of the
approaches; individual ideological or political views; the
absence of current examples and evidence for successful
supply-side focused approaches; a tendency to stick to
known approaches; a preference for incremental, evolu-
tionary approaches over radical and rapid change; ‘mar-
ket thinking’ being ingrained, widespread and pervasive;
awareness that an overt attack on market thinking and
values is difficult and daring; and awareness that market
agenda-setters have successfully framed attempts to reg-
ulate aspects of life where the market operates as illegiti-
mate, unjustified interference by a ‘nanny state’.
The extent of ‘market thinking’ was an echo of Bor-
land’s view in relation to the regulated market model
that:
’For countries like Australia, with strong commit-
ments to free markets, there are challenges of rethink-
ing how the model actually fits within a system that
is designed to encourage competition and innovation’
[38].
A key finding was the importance of framing. The
findings suggest that if tobacco is seen as just another
legally traded commodity in the marketplace, supply-
side interventions make little sense. But when tobacco is
viewed as a highly hazardous and addictive product tar-
geted at children, then regulation by the state and radi-
cal supply-side measures may be viewed as legitimate,
desirable or even required in order to protect children
and public health.
Strengths and limitations of the research
This was a qualitative, exploratory research project,
intended to open up a new field of study. As far as we
are aware this is the first study which has explored reac-
tions of key practitioners, opinion leaders and decision-
makers to radical supply-focused endgame solutions for
the tobacco epidemic. We successfully tested supply-
side focused tobacco control approaches which have
been proposed in the literature with informed and
articulate research participants. Our impression of the
interviews and focus groups was that the participants,
though they had little or no previous awareness of such
approaches, were highly engaged with the topic and as a
group provided an incisive and well-informed commen-
tary on the endgame approaches discussed. Comments
from key informants provided insights into initial
responses to supply-side approaches and how they
might work in practice. We identified a range of key
barriers, misunderstandings and difficulties which could
inform communication strategies for endgame ideas.
An important limitation is that the findings may be
somewhat context specific to New Zealand in 2008, and
may not be generalisable to other populations and set-
tings. Also, the discussions were of new and unfamiliar
ideas and occurred somewhat in the abstract, as at the
time of data collection none of these ideas had received
any substantial exposure in the media or public dis-
course. Nevertheless, New Zealand shares many similari-
ties with other English-speaking jurisdictions and
discourses revealed (e.g. the ‘nanny-state’) occur in other
countries [43,44]. Finally, this was a qualitative study
with a small number of participants from highly selected
sectors of society. The results may therefore not be gen-
eralisable. Similar studies would be needed to under-
stand the views of the wider public, including smokers,
and other key stakeholders potentially affected by differ-
ent endgame policy options.
Further research and policy analysis
Further research is suggested; in particular into explor-
ing what underpins the doubts and reservations partici-
pants expressed and how these might be addressed,
along with further policy analysis and development of
the models and actions. Such work may help determine
the degree to which these endgame strategies are likely
to be effective and politically and logistically feasible to
implement.
Specifically, policy analysis, research and economic
modelling are needed on the relative costs and benefits
of different models/actions versus the status quo, or
expanded tobacco control within existing structures.
Specific work is also needed on trade law requirements;
taxation; framing of tobacco; smuggling and growing
tobacco; implementation of particular models; legal,
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requirements, and public information and communica-
tion approaches. Lessons may also be learnt from closer
studies of policy-makers and public attitudes to other
endgames (e.g., eradicating infectious diseases such as
poliomyelitis, or phase-outs of other hazardous products
such as leaded petrol, chlorofluorocarbons and asbestos).
Implications for practice
The findings suggest approaches for advocacy efforts for
the endgame. These include: better establishing the
extent and urgency of the public health problem due to
smoking; developing a credible tobacco-free vision; the
importance of framing of tobacco products as extremely
hazardous to society and a threat to children’sw e l l -
being; developing a counter to the ‘nanny state’ dis-
course and legitimising the state’s role in protecting citi-
zens from unscrupulous business practices and
dangerous products; and using simple and clear analo-
gies to justify the use of supply-side approaches.
Conclusions
The findings suggest that supply-side focused tobacco
control interventions and bold endgame solutions are
worth exploring further. The findings suggest that a sig-
nificant change in the public framing of tobacco may be
a prerequisite for implementing endgame solutions.
Further policy analysis, research and public discussion
are needed to investigate and further develop endgame
approaches. This work is important, as these ideas could
help eliminate the enormous burden of ill health, pre-
ventable death and health inequalities caused by the
tobacco epidemic.
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